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FOREWORD
The Institute of Government and Public Affairs, established by the
University of Illinois Board of Trustees pursuant to a resolution adopted by
the 1947 General Assembly, is directed to undertake a number of functions.
This study of the Illinois General Assembly is a product of two types of
activity included within the Institute's mandate: (1) to provide practical
instruction in government and public affairs to the students of the Univer-
sity of Illinois, through the sponsoring of lectures and seminars; and (2) to
investigate problems in government and to make the results of studies
freely available.
Staff members of the Institute, over the past five years, have worked
directly with Illinois legislative commissions created to study governmental
problems and have had unusual opportunities to observe the work of the
General Assembly. The authors have had close and especially valuable con-
tact with the Illinois legislative process on both a formal and informal basis.
Mr. Samuel K. Gove served, in 1950 and 1951, on the staff of the Com-
mission to Study State Government and Dr. Gilbert Y. Steiner, from 1951 to
1953, served as research associate with the Municipal Revenue Commission.
The authors worked with the legislative leaders of both parties in seeing
the work of the commissions through the legislative sessions, and in aiding
in the preparation of legislation. Mr. Gove is currently serving on the
research staff of the State Personnel Administration Commission created
by the 1953 General Assembly.
In carrying out its function of providing opportunity to University of
Illinois students to study the practical operation of government, the Institute
of Government and Public Affairs, with the Department of Political
Science, in 1953 sponsored four lectures on the campus dealing with the
Illinois General Assembly. These lectures were given by legislative leaders
of both political parties in the two houses: Speaker Warren Wood, Repre-
sentative Paul Powell, Senator George Drach and Senator William J. Lynch.
The authors have quoted liberally from the lectures.
The Institute of Government and Public Affairs gratefully acknowledges
its debt to the four legislators for their cooperation in making the lectures
possible and for their willingness to review the manuscript, thereby assist-
ing in its development. Other legislators assisted unknowingly by serving
as guides and mentors in aiding the Institute staff to gain a better under-
standing of the legislative process in the Illinois General Assembly and to
them the staff expresses its thanks.
Professors Charles M. Kneier, Clyde F. Snider, Neil F. Garvey, Rubin
G. Cohn, Murray Edclman, and Tom Page, of the University of Illinois;
Dr. Jack F. IsakofT of the Illinois Legislative Council; and Dr. Richard G.
Browne of the Teachers College Board, have read and commented on
preliminary drafts and their assistance is gratefully acknowledged.
As is the case in all studies published by the Institute, maximum freedom
has been accorded the authors. The views expressed and the conclusions
reached are theirs.
ROYDEN DANGERFIELD, Director
Institute of Government and Public Affairs
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THE FRAMEWORK FOR ACTION
The Illinois General Assembly is a bicameral legislative body convening
in regular session at the state capitol in Springfield in January of every odd-
numbered year. Fifty-one Senators are elected for four year terms from
single member districts, while 153 Representatives are chosen, three from
each Senatorial district, for two year terms by means of a cumulative voting
system which usually permits the minority party in each Senatorial district
to win one of the three seats. The Constitution establishes no terminal date
for the session, but adjournment by June 30 is the established practice. By
constitutional directive, bills may originate in either house, and, on final
passage, "the vote shall be by yeas and nays, upon each bill separately, and
shall be entered upon the journal; and no bill shall become a law without
the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each house."
^ Each
house is the judge of the qualifications of its own members, elects its own
officers (except that the Constitution makes the Lieutenant-Governor pre-
siding officer of the Senate), and determines its own rules of procedure.
This paper deals only with selected aspects of Illinois General Assembly
activity. The paper does not attempt systematically to describe organiza-
tion or procedures in the manner of a manual, but rather seeks to highlight
and analyze those elements that are of particular importance in understand-
ing how the General Assembly works. Although the 1953 session is used as a
focal point, and most of the illustrative material is drawn from that as-
sembly, this is not intended to be a chronicle of any particular legislative
session. It is an effort to generalize about the Illinois legislative process on
the basis of observation, participation, interview and study.
^Illinois Constitution of 1870, Article IV, section 12.
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Membership
Lawmaking is a part time occupation for all but a few members of
the Illinois General Assembly. Participation in legislative activity is neither
sufficiently demanding, sufficiently lucrative, nor sufficiently secure for
members to abandon professional or business interests. Consequently, one
of the most striking phenomena in the Illinois legislative houses is the con-
tinuing struggle of the members, as individuals, to find a satisfactory ad-
justment between their public and private pursuits.
The same struggle is to be found in the case of many public officials on
all governmental levels. Governors, congressmen, state and federal judges
all have continuous public duties and are expected to give up, or at least
sharply to curtail active participation in private pursuits. While the situa-
tion is not peculiar to state legislators, it is most pronounced for them be-
cause legislative sessions have a limited life span— in Illinois, approximately
six months. The members view their service in Springfield as a "legislative
interlude." It is not surprising that the General Assembly has recorded its
official impatience with procedures that result in the "energy of large
numbers of legislators being . . . diverted from their professions and
livelihoods."^
There is no reason to expect the concern for legislative business to be
either exclusive or dominant in the affairs of any member. This does not
mean that the Illinois legislature is split into occupational blocs. Lawyers
are the largest single occupational group, but little cohesion as lawyers is
evident among this thirty percent of the membership. In matters of judicial
revision, compensation for court appointed counsel, grand jury terms,
amendments to the civil practice act, and other issues of special interest to
lawyers, their voting behavior has been more in accord with a political party
interest or a regional interest than an occupational interest. This is not to
suggest that individual lawyers have or have not been swayed by the nature
of their clientele, but only that there is no apparent general tendency for
attorneys to act as a group.
Fewer than ten percent of the members are farmers, a circumstance that
is surprising in a legislature that has not been reapportioned in over fifty
years. The only other occupation with a consistently significant representa-
tion is that of insurance agent-— about 1/20 of the total membership. Pro-
fessional educators rarely sit in the General Assembly, although the dean
of an unaffiliated Chicago law school has served for fourteen years. An
occasional clergyman, a medical doctor or two, a few local government em-
ployees, and small businessmen fill out the roster. Students, social workers,
engineers, accountants and bankers are some of the occupational groups
Laws of Illinois, 1937, p. 211.
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that are infrequently represented, and are usually dependent on other
groups for access to the legislature in Illinois.^
One out of four members is new when the regular session convenes in
January of every odd-numbered year, but this experience ratio should be
trimmed down by ten to fifteen percent to account for "new" members
who have had prior but not continuous service.* Intercameral movement
is almost all one way— from the House to the Senate— and three or four
Representatives have graduated at most recent elections and thereby ac-
quired a four year term and an increase in relative voting strength from
1:153 to 1:51, but almost no other perquisites of significance.
Indeed, a move to the Senate can diminish a legislator's security. The Illi-
nois system of cumulative voting is designed to insure minority party repre-
sentation in the House. This constitutional provision has been implemented
by a statutory grant of authority to the various state senatorial party com-
mittees to determine the number of candidates each party will place on the
ballot for the three House seats at each general election. The efTects of
giving the committees this determination have been materially to reduce
the number of candidates and the number of contests and to afTord
minority representation in districts dominated by one party. It has become
the practice in many districts to name two candidates from one party and
one candidate from the other thereby assuring the election of all primary
winners, assuming that no independent candidates file. Plainly, some
'
Complete occupational breakdown of the 68th General Assembly as furnished
by the members is as follows:
Senate: Lawyers —-34, Farmers— 3, Insurance— 5, Brokers — 2.
Newspaper— 2, Other occupations— 13.
House: Lawyers— 37, Farmers— 12, Legislators— 10, Insurance— 8,
Real Estate— 4, Real Estate (investment and insurance) — 4,
Lawyer and Farm Manager— 3, Merchant— 3, Retired— 3,
Salesman— 3, Automobile Sales— 2, Banker and Farmer— 2,
Electrical Business — 2, Homemaker— 2, Physician— 2,
Publisher— 2, Secretary— 2, Other occupations— 50.
Source: Sixty-eighth General Assembly, Handbook, Illinois Legislature, 1953,
pp. 15, 117f.
* The rate of turnover of new members in the 68th General Assembly was less
than in the 67th session, but in line on a percentage basis with the pattern in recent
years. The number of new members in the 1951 session was 52 ( 11 Senators and 41
Representatives) as contrasted with the 49 new members in the 1953 session. The
House, as would be expected, had a somewhat larger turnover in membership at the
1953 session than did the Senate. There were 37 new members in the former
chamber, of whom 21 were Republicans. Eight of the "new" members had served in
at least one previous session. Twenty-one of the 37 new members came from down-
state districts. The Senate's new contingent consisted of twelve, all downstate Repub-
licans. Four of the twelve new Senators had been "promoted" from the House, and
one of those promoted had previously served one term in the Senate.
For a detailed study of the rate of turnover in the Illinois legislature, see George
S. Blair "The Case for Cumulative Voting in Illinois," Northwestern University Law
Review, v. 47 (July-August 1952), p. 354.
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legislators are able to protect their own seats in the general election by
throwing their influence against any attempt by their party to contest
other seats in the district. "He never lets them run more than one," is
said about at least one veteran House member who is regularly the only
nominee of his party. In the November, 1952 general election, contests were
held in only 23 of the 51 districts, and in only one of these were more than
four candidates seeking the three seats. This high measure of security is not
available to members of the Senate. There are so-called "safe" districts for
Senators but they arc not safe to the extent of being uncontested after the
primary.
Although the Constitution authorizes the Governor to call a special elec-
tion to fill a vacancy in either house, the practice is to leave unfilled House
seats vacated by death or resignation, but to fill, by special election, Senate
seats that become vacant prior to the second session of the term. The effect
of leaving seats vacant is to make the passage of legislation more difficult
because of the constitutional limitation that "no bill shall become a law
without the concurrence of a majority of the members elected to each
house." The vacant seat thus becomes, in effect, a "no" vote.^
Each house is the judge on the seating of its own members. Although
election contests are relatively frequent, and occasionally a member is un-
seated, final decisions are usually delayed to a date well beyond the organiz-
ing period, and during the interim the candidate certified by the Governor
serves without prejudice.
Apportionment
I know members of the House of Representatives who, if you rein-
stated the rack, would not vote for reapportionment that would permit
the county of Cook to dominate the legislature, either at the Senate or
at the House level."
In 1901, the General Assembly last complied with the constitutional
directive to apportion the state every ten years so that 51 districts would be
created, none of which would include less than 4/5 of the state's total popu-
lation divided by fifty-one." There appears to be no chance that any Gen-
eral Assembly will conform to the directive, and the success, in 1953, of a
resolution to propose a constitutional amendment which would change the
method of apportionment is considered an extraordinary achievement.^
° There was one Senate vacancy caused by the death of an incumbent before the
convening of the 1953 session, and another seat became vacant on the first day of
the session upon the resignation of a Senator who had been elected to state office.
Three House seats became vacant on the death of members, one before the conven-
ing of the session and two during the session.
*
Speaker Warren Wood — lecture, University of Illinois, April 23, 1953.
'
Illinois Constitution of 1870, Article IV, section 6.
^Senate Joint Resolution 32, Sixty-eighth General Assembly. (Subsequent to
the original publication of this bulletin, the amendment was ratified at the 1954 gen-
eral election.)
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Any constituent of a member, or any group composed of constituents of
a member, may find its influence to be related to the size of the legisla-
tor's district. Where a combination of 12,047 votes can elect a member, as
in Illinois' 17th district, he may be expected to be more responsive to any
cohesive group of 1,000 say, than a member who needs 253,451 votes to
retain his seat, as in the 7th district. In fact, thirty-six of the fifty-one dis-
tricts have a population below the state ratio, and twenty-eight districts
have a population below the minimum allowed by the Constitution.
The status quo in apportionment has not been protected by either
political party as a way of maintaining relative strength. The five smallest
districts are Democratic, and the six largest districts are, with one excep-
tion, Republican but party control has been less of an issue than the present
assignment of only 19 districts to Cook County and 32 districts downstate.
The state's population is now approximately evenly divided between the
two areas.
Compensation and Perquisites
If any member of the legislature went down there just for the
money, I don't think we would have anybody that would run for office.'
Members of the Illinois General Assembly are among the higher paid
state legislators in the United States. Salaries have been raised from the
1895 level of $3,000 per session to $3,500 in 1915, $5,000 in 1937, $6,000 in
1947, and finally to $10,000 beginning with the 1953 session. A larger sum is
paid only by New York, and legislators there meet annually. The General
Assembly has given no indication as to whether it intends the increased
salaries to reflect only the increased cost of living, or whether it is seeking
to move in the direction of making the compensation adequate to merit full
time employment on legislative matters. In addition, Illinois legislators
benefit from one of the more liberal state legislative pension plans.
During the session, members, of course, are obliged to maintain Spring-
field residences. Most legislators put up at a hotel, a few seek out more
permanent arrangements, but in either case it is not possible to do more
than barely break even, if that, on the weekly expense allowance computed
at $.10 a mile for one round trip between the member's home and the
capitol. Interim commission appointees are usually partly compensated for
the burden of additional work by a per diem for room, board and mis-
cellany in addition to the mileage allowance.
Additional expenses, not deductible for federal income tax purposes are
incurred at regular intervals for campaigning. There is a small stationery
allowance for each member which is adequate only because state legislators
are not recipients of the quantities of mail that come to a Congressman and
because many Illinois legislators do not seem to feel a compulsion to respond
^
Representative Paul Powell, Minority Leader— lecture, University of Illinois,
April 23, 1953.
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personally to letters from any but their own constituents. There is no allow-
ance to individual members for clerical or stenographic help, although such
service is provided through central pools.
A limited amount of housekeeping patronage is at the disposal of the
leadership. In addition to the Secretary, Sergeant-at-Arms, Postmaster and
Enrolling Clerk who are designated officers of the Senate, four positions are
assigned to the President of the Senate, and 60 additional positions, ranging
from pages at $8.00 per diem to an assistant secretary at $18.00 per diem,
were created at the 1953 session. On the House side, the equivalent four
officers were established, five employees were assigned to the Speaker, and
95 additional positions were set up.
Leadership and Committee Structure
As leader, I appoint minority members to committees. I take into
consideration their past experience, what committees they served on
previously, and their business or professional activities in order to assign
my people to those committees where they will not only render best
service to the legislature and to the people of Illinois, but will at times
remember that they are Democrats."*
The practice of seniority in the Illinois General Assembly is, at best,
casual, which helps to explain frequent competition for leadership posts.
Seniority controls the order in which members' seat location preferences are
honored, but it alone does not determine either committee appointments or
chairmanships. Moreover, party leadership is not necessarily continuous, and
it is not unusual to have several changes in these positions from session to
session even though there is no change in the controlling party. For example,
there is no sure continuity as Speaker, and a former Republican speaker sat
in both 1951 and 1953 as a member of the House. The Speaker, himself
reelected, named a new floor leader in 1953 passing over the member who
held this position in 1951. The Senate majority chose a new President pro
tempore and a new whip, and the minority changed leadership. The presi-
dent pro tem position had been left vacant by death, but the Democrats
elected a new minority leader over the objections of the Chicago "regular"
who had held the position in the 1951 session and was a candidate to
succeed himself.
Legislative leadership is forthcoming from the Governor of Illinois. The
Senate majority whip described the procedure during the 1953 session:
Every Monday night the Speaker of the House, the majority leader
of the House, the majority whip of the House, the President pro tem of
the Senate, the majority whip of the Senate meet with the Governor on
the subject of legislation pending or proposed, in connection with which
we generally invite the proponents of any particular measure that is then
very current, or the chairman of the committee before which some spe-
'" Senator William Lynch, Minority Leader— lecture. University of Illinois,
April 30, 1953. See Appendix A for statistics on party strength in recent years.
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cial and important legislation is pending. We go over the legislation, its
potentialities, its possibilities, whether it is feasible, whether it is desir-
able, and we thresh it out as well as we know how."
Some measures never make the Monday night meetings and floor leaders
have been known to ask a bill's sponsor during a committee hearing whether
a proposal has been cleared with the Governor. Policy decisions do not seem
to be reached in comparable conferences on the minority side. During the
1953 legislative session, no regular meetings were held between House and
Senate Democratic leaders. Although caucuses were frequent among Demo-
crats in each chamber, little planned intercameral cohesion existed between
minority members. This circumstance is partly explained by the fact that the
minority is not expected to offer a positive program, and its leaders are
therefore unconcerned with strategic problems of timing, lining up votes
and precise language. A sort of vicious circle develops wherein the minority
minimizes bicameral party organization because it eschews positive policy
responsibility, a decision which, in turn, precludes the need for bicameral
party organization.
The House is geared to a system of smooth communication between the
leadership and the rank and file members. Under the rules, the Speaker and
the majority and minority leaders and whips serve as members ex officio of
all committees. Although the floor leaders on both sides do appear at com-
mittee sessions, vote and watch how others vote, the Speaker, perhaps out
of deference to the idea that he is the Speaker for the whole House, rarely
participates in the partisan debates either on the floor or in committee. In
the 1953 session, the Speaker spoke from the floor only once, when he made
an eff"ective appeal for support of the reapportionment resolution.
^^
The use of the electrical voting device in the House during the last two
sessions would also seem to improve the chances for obedience to leaders
because communication is carried out through red and green lights on the
big board at the front of the House chamber. Members can watch the board
to see how the leaders vote, and a party regular whose name comes early in
the alphabet can postpone casting his vote until his leader snaps either the
red or the green. Prior to the electric roll call, of course, it was frequently
inconvenient for a party leader whose name came in the lower third of the
alphabet to make his vote known before many members on his side had
voted. With the present technique, there need be no uncertainty. Indeed,
" Senator George Drach, Majority Whip — lecture, University of Illinois, April
30, 1953.
'During the 1953 session, the Lieutenant-Governor was permitted, by suspension
of the rules with unanimous consent, to enter into the debate on a bill to create a
Commission on Equal Job Opportunities. His participation was rather unusual as the
Lieutenant-Governor, unlike the Speaker of the House, is principally an executive
officer and has no inherent right to take part formally in the development of
legislation.
13]
some members will watch carefully to see whether the leader of one party
and one of his lieutenants snap the same light. Agreement between these two
is said to signal party regulars to fall in line, disagreement to authorize a
so-called free vote.
Committee chairmen who, in the first instance, determine whether and
when a bill will be heard are not chosen in accord with any regularly estab-
lished practice, although, other things being equal, the incumbent can
usually expect reappointment. In at least one of the two most recent sessions,
an influential veteran of fourteen sessions was without a chairmanship, a
House member serving his second term became chairman of an important
committee, a Senator was refused reappointment as head of a committee by
way of discipline for lack of party regularity. The House and Senate
Rules Committees were chaired by the Speaker and President pro tem
respectively, thereby identifying rules of legislative procedure with the
substantive responsibilities of these leaders.
Formal House committee assignments are made by the Speaker, subject
to limitations on committee size written into the rules. Actually an initial
determination of party split for each of the twenty legislative and three
housekeeping committees is made in accordance with the relative strength
of each party in the House. Within this framework, leaders make committee
assignments based on the expressed preferences of members, all of whom are
asked to indicate their first five committee choices. Despite his formal au-
thority, the Speaker no more intrudes on the selection of minority members
than the minority leader intrudes on the selection of majority personnel.
Some members, particularly chairmen of important committees, ask for and
receive assignment to fewer than five committees, but except for ex officio
status, the rules limit the maximum number of committees on which any
member of the House may serve to five. In practice, all the lawyers in the
House constitute the Judiciary Committee, thereby limiting lawyers to
service on that body and four others.
The Senate is presently unwilling to lodge in its presiding officer even
formal power to appoint committees. An intense legislative interest in the
separation of legislative and executive powers contributes to a Senate
decision to deny legislative powers to the Lieutenant-Governor. By way of
demonstrating that the question is basically one of principle, rather than
partisanship, the role of the President of the Senate has not been affected
by the party affiliation of the particular incumbent.^^ The present manner
of Senate committee selection indicates some departure from formal rule in
"Senate rules were amended in 1949 to deny the Lieutenant-Governor power
to assign bills and appoint committees. At that time, the Senate majority was Repub-
lican, the Lieutenant-Governor a Democrat. No change was made in the rule in
1953 when a Republican Lieutenant-Governor presided over a Republican Senate.
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that formal authority is delegated to a Committee on Committees and, in
practice, pre-session caucuses named the leaders of both parties to that
committee. The jurisdiction of the committee extends to the determination
of standing committee size as well as personnel, and to the selection of
Senate members of conference and special committees as well as Senate and
joint commissions. Delegation of authority to vary the total membership of
standing committees from session to session has enabled the Committee on
Committees to relate party strength on committees to the party division of
the full Senate and still comply, in the main, with the wishes of individual
members as to assignments. No rule limits the number of committees on
which a Senator may serve, and some members have as many as ten
assignments. Senate officers do not serve as ex officio committee members.
Cook County, if under-represented where total seats is the standard,
suffers from no such discrimination if recent House committee chairman-
ships are made a measure of influence. In 1953, ten of the twenty House
standing committees concerned with legislation were chaired by Cook
County members. Although Cook County members headed only seven of the
twenty-eight Senate committees, interim joint commissions on youth, mu-
nicipal revenue, sex ofTenders, and the judicial article elected as chairmen
Senators who represented Cook County districts. Cook County weakness in
Senate standing committee chairmanships was overcome by the appointment
of a Chicago Senator as President pro tem, while Cook's strength in House
committee leadership was balanced by the choice of downstate Representa-
tives as Speaker, majority leader and whip.
Time Limits on the Session
Beginning perhaps with abatement, and ending down the alphabet
with workmen's compensation, we consider some 2,000 bills covering the
law, every phase of human interest. We are not capable of making a
complete analysis of that much legislation in the six months every two
years in which we sit in the General Assembly."
A technical time saving improvement like electric voting is important in
this state's legislature because of the constitutional specifications that bills
may be passed by recorded vote only, and that laws become effective on the
July 1 following passage, unless declared urgent and passed by a vote of
two-thirds of all members elected. This latter provision not only has the
practical effect of compelling the General Assembly to finish its work by
June 30, but also discourages special sessions on controversial questions.
Nevertheless, special sessions, restricted to the consideration of matters
spelled out in the call, have been common in Illinois legislative history, the
last such session dating back to 1950.
Given a need to call the roll on all bills reaching passage stage, and the
" Senator George Drach, Majority Whip— lecture, University of Illinois, April
30, 1953.
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certainty of a termination date for the regular session, electric voting in the
House acts as a time compressor and makes it possible for a greater volume
of business to be completed before June 30 than would otherwise be pos-
sible. ^"^ Between 1931, when the legislature completed its work on June 20,
and 1953, when adjournment came on June 27, the sessions regularly ran
up to the last night, and since 1931 the General Assembly has been content
to adjourn and to let the post-session vetoes fall as they may without chal-
lenge. In 1949, the Senate sought to recess and return to act on veto mes-
sages, but the House would not follow suit. The Governor exercised his
constitutional power and prorogued the legislature.^^ Barring an extraordi-
nar)' majority, the legislature must complete passage of a bill (as distin-
guished from overriding a veto) by June 30 if the measure is to be effective
the same year. This provision, along with the understanding of the members
that the legislature is a part-time job from which they can expect to return
to private activities in their home districts has made a July 1 adjournment
virtually mandatory. One obvious consequence is the invitation to an end of
session jam that can be more critical than that in Congress. At the national
level, persistent legislators may be able to delay a planned adjournment until
some disposition is made of their program. Sponsors of legislation in Illinois
not only must overcome substantive opposition to their proposals, but they
must do so before the sun rises on the first of July.
Although there can be no real filibustering because the rules of both
houses permit termination of debate, a determined member will sometimes
threaten the use of dilatory tactics, a practice that could be especially
disruptive after mid-June. On June 23, 1953, one House minority member
used the word "filibuster" as a lever on the House leadership to press Senate
leaders to move his bill in the second chamber. Four days earlier, the House
majority whip indicated that he was ready to delay business unless a pending
bill was killed. Both members achieved their objectives.
With a nice concern for orderliness, and by way of facilitating adjourn-
ment, both houses use a "clearing the Calendar" method of reducing the
number of bills to be considered in the last two weeks of the session. In 1953,
for example, an initial move to implement this procedure, a motion to table
all House bills in House committees, was made on June 18. On succeeding
days, blanket motions to table bills farther along the legislative process were
made, until finally, on June 26th, the day before the planned sine die ad-
journment, a concluding motion was made to table all Senate bills in the
House on the order of third reading. The Senate adopted similar broad
motions to table all bills that had not advanced beyond certain steps in the
'' The Senate, in an efTort to speed business, will frequently by unanimous con-
sent, apply the same roll call to a series of non-controversial measures.
^^
Illinois Constitution of 1870, Article V, section 9.
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legislative process, so that by the time of adjournment there was literally no
pending business.
Passage of a bill in Illinois depends, in part at least, on the sense of
timing of its adherents. Not infrequently, the line between having a bill slip
through in the rush to adjourn, and having a bill tabled in the rush to
adjourn is a narrow one. Experienced and influential legislators take advan-
tage of both techniques, while the amateur is sometimes left with a state-
ment prepared for a committee that has been by-passed, or with a motion to
advance a bill that has already been tabled. In the two weeks before ad-
journment, nearly all bills that have passed the house of origin are advanced
in the second chamber without reference to a committee. Advancement
without reference is critical to passage of a bill after motions have carried to
clear the calendars and to table all bills in committee, because any bill
pursuing the normal legislative steps at that point is automatically defeated
when sent to committee.
Among bills passed by one or both chambers without reference to com-
mittee because time was running out on the 1953 session were one that
would have created a state building authority with extensive discretionary
power over public building construction, one that would have reestablished
an interim commission on municipal revenue with a $50,000 appropriation,
and one that created a new agency with plenary power over a toll road
system.^' If any member felt that these matters were too important to be
permitted to pass without committee consideration and a chance for inter-
ested groups to be heard, he did not record such sentiments by objecting to
the required unanimous consent. Controversial bills are surely passed at the
end of the session without as extensive a scrutiny as they would receive at an
earlier date, and some legislators deliberately delay pushing certain bills
until the last possible moment.
On the other hand, the constitutional requirement that every bill must
be read on three separate legislative days in each house acts as a brake, and
an important bill is rarely defeated by a tabling motion, unless its defeat is
agreed to by most of those concerned. Sometimes, however, as with the loss
of an administration sponsored Senate bill creating a crime investigation
commission, communications seem to break down. The House majority
floor leader, during the last week of the 1953 session, filed the required one
day notice of a motion to discharge the House Executive Committee from
further consideration of the crime commission bill, and to place the bill on
the House calendar on the order of Senate bills on second reading. Imme-
diately after the notice was filed, a sweeping motion to table all Senate bills
" The building authority and municipal revenue commission bills were subse-
quently vetoed, the toll road bill approved.
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in House committees was made and carried. This had the effect of killing
the crime commission bill even though notice of a discharge motion had
been filed.
Some legislators have expressed concern over the consequences of late
session
"log jams" and have urged alleviating procedural action, but there
is no evidence of a broad interest in changing a pattern that has been useful.
The Legislative Council was directed to study the question, and suggested,
among other things, pre-session filing of bills with the Secretary of State.
^^
A bill to implement this plan was introduced late in the last session, and was
itself a victim of a motion to table all bills in committee. Under its terms, the
Secretary of State would have been required to receive and print bills prior
to the convening of the General Assembly. A similar assumption that more
calendar time is needed to transact legislative business was inherent in the
terms of a proposed joint resolution to amend the legislative article of the
Constitution and provide, among other things, for annual legislative sessions.
The resolution received favorable consideration in the House Executive
Committee, but its sponsors never called it up for full House consideration.
The whole question of the adequacy of the six month biennial session is
illuminated by a study of legislative days and calendar days. Ordinarily, the
first weeks of a session find the General Assembly meeting on Tuesdays and
Wednesdays only. By the third or fourth month, Thursday perfunctory
sessions are added at which noncontroversial bills are advanced under a
gentlemen's agreement prohibiting quorum calls. It is not until the last
month that meetings are held five days a week (see Table 1). Nor is the
earlier part of the session devoted to intensive committee work. Committees
meet, with rare exceptions, just after adjournment of the House or Senate,
and, except for the latter part of the session, no member will be asked to
come to Springfield on a non-legislative day just for a committee meeting.
On the other hand, committee meetings are held at every possible moment
in June, and some members who find that they have three or four simulta-
neous meetings either as committee members or as protagonists of legislation
will arrange to have their votes recorded without actually participating in
the committee work. Just as some bills can slip through late in the session
without reference to committee, others can be held in committee until late
in the session and moved at the last possible moment when legislative busi-
ness is most hectic. As long as this kind of opportunity is available to all
legislators, it is probably fanciful to expect a move to eliminate the end of
session
"jam." Its principal effect is to make logrolling easier, and the
legislative process depends on logrolling.
"Illinois Legislative Council, Scheduling Legislative Workloads, (Springfield:
May, 1952). Another popular suggestion involved revision of the present rules in
order to establish a terminal date for the introduction of new bills.
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TABLE 1
68TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY, 1953
DAYS IN SESSION
Key:
Regular
Both Houses Perfunctory
n Senate Perfunctory, House Regular
O House Perfunctory, Senate Regular
January
Committee Influence
I think we would be able to conduct more business more efficiently
if the committees would find a bad bill bad and say so at the committee
level."'
A "do pass" recommendation by a committee of the Illinois legislature
is considerbaly less conclusive an indicator of ultimate disposition of a bill
than is a "do not pass" recommendation. House and Senate committees
vote out innumerable bills that have little or no chance of passage. In some
cases, favorable action is taken out of deference to the sponsor. In other
instances, the pressures exerted on a legislator as a member of a small
committee are more intense than the pressures exerted on him as a member
of the whole House or Senate. The latter kind of situation frequently is
shown in an explanation by a member as he casts his vote in committee
that "This bill is of such wide interest, it deserves to come to the floor. But
I do not pledge to support it on the floor." Over half of the bills defeated
during the 1953 session were killed on the floors after having received
favorable committee action.^"
On the other hand, negative committee action that bills "do not pass,"
— either in the form of recommendations or by postponement of considera-
tion— is generally upheld without challenge. Only twelve motions to non-
concur in unfavorable committee action were made in 1953. Other bills
unfavorably reported were allowed to die without a fight. Only one bill on
which a motion was made to non-concur became law, although two others
passed both houses but were vetoed. An important administration sponsored
House bill— to create a Committee on Equal Employment Opportunities—
died in the Senate after a non-concur motion was defeated.
No committee of the Illinois legislature can pigeonhole a bill that its
sponsor is determined to push. Any member of either chamber, subject to
recognition by the chair, can compel a record vote of the full membership
on a motion to discharge a committee from further consideration of a bill.
In practice, however, discharge motions are more frequently successful in
speeding non-controversial bills on their way than in forcing action on a bill
that a committee is attempting to kill by inaction. Controversial bills on
which a committee prefers not to act are very likely the kinds of bills on
which most members prefer not to be recorded. Consequently, it is unusual
for a discharge motion to be successful where a controversy is involved.
Expressions of regard for the importance of established procedure
— the fol-
lowing of committee recommendations— will be forthcoming from all sides,
"Speaker Warren L. Wood — lecture, University of Illinois, April 23, 1953.
'"Of the 1,665 bills introduced at the 1953 session, 724 failed to pass both
houses. Of these 724, 341 (or 47%) were defeated in committees of either house
and the remaining 53 ''/c were killed on the floors. (For detailed statistical data on
legislati%-e action, see Appendix B.)
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and the discharge motion defeated as, for example, in 1953, with a bill
requiring equal employment opportunities for the physically handicapped.
Twenty-five discharge motions were successful in 1953, but most of these
dealt with bills that had been overlooked rather than studiously ignored.
Fifteen of the 25 ultimately became law.
The threat of a motion to discharge can sometimes produce action.
Federal rent controls were about to end in April, 1953, and the state admin-
istration had not yet produced a legislative proposal or indicated that it
intended to support any kind of state action. In the meantime, the Senate
Municipalities Committee had taken no action on a bill sponsored by the
minority leader that would have authorized municipalities to provide local
controls. The sponsor informally served notice that he would move to dis-
charge the Committee and put every member of the Senate on record. To
forestall this, the administration accelerated development of an eviction
moratorium bill, and an agreement was entered into whereby no opposition
was offered to discharging the Municipalities Committee so that the local
control measure and the administration bill might be heard simultaneously
by the entire Senate sitting as a Committee of the Whole. The eviction
moratorium proposal was subsequently advanced and enacted, while the
local option bill was stricken from the calendar after the hearing. The cer-
tainty that a showdown could be provoked contributed to the decision to
offer an alternative plan because the pressures on the majority compel some
kind of action when a record vote on a minority bill with popular appeal is
imminent.
The need for appointment of a conference committee is unusual in the
Illinois legislature because the house of origin will frequently accept an
amendment adopted in the second chamber. Only eight bills went to con-
ference at the last session; in each instance, the report of the committee was
adopted. The conference in the last two sessions that provoked the most
extensive floor debate was that on conflicting versions of a gas tax bill in the
1951 session when the persistence of the House majority and the Speaker
won a compromise from the Senate after several managers for each body
had resigned from the committee and several fruitless meetings had been
held. The more frequent situation is a single amiable meeting (at which the
managers are unencumbered by instructions), agreement and easy adoption
of the conference report by both houses. Intercameral rivalry is not much in
evidence in the Illinois General Assembly although the present Speaker of
the House has suggested that the shorter term of House members makes
them relatively more responsive to the public,
^^ an attitude that may stiffen
House conferees when there is need for conference committee action.
Lecture, University of Illinois, April 23, 1953.
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Commissions, Interim Committees, and Legislative Aids
Over and above standing committees, three types of fact finding bodies
exist in the IlHnois legislative pattern: 1) permanent, continuous joint
commissions established by law and assigned a broad study area; 2) joint
commissions established by law to study a problem, or problem area, during
the interim between regular sessions, and directed to report to the next
session; 3) joint or single chamber ad hoc committees established by law or
resolution at one session and directed to make a relatively narrow study of a
pressing problem, and to report recommendations back to the same session.
In addition, the Legislative Council, which partakes of some of the charac-
teristics of each of these, is authorized to direct its permanent staff to study
problems raised by any legislator both during and between sessions. The
important distinction between the Council and other commissions and com-
mittees of the General Assembly is that the Legislative Council adheres solely
to a fact finding role and refrains from recommending policy. In some in-
stances, this has led to proposals for the creation of special or interim com-
missions which will move beyond fact finding. A council study is not de-
signed to be a gateway to quick action.
--
Although professional staffing for standing committees is not a part of
the Illinois legislative picture, the joint Budgetary Commission which per-
forms a kind of legislative budget making function, does employ an account-
ant and the House Appropriations Committee, for the last two sessions, has
accepted the services of a staff member of the Taxpayers' Federation of
Ilhnois as a fiscal analyst. Not infrequently, and most particularly in the
case of interim commissions, professional personnel employed for research
activity will be available through the session for hearings and related pur-
poses. Executive departments are sometimes asked, and are usually anxious,
to lend personnel to legislative committees. All House and Senate members
may avail themselves of the research services of the Legislative Council and
the bill drafting services of the Reference Bureau. Some members insist as a
condition of sponsorship that proposals at least be scrutinized by the Refer-
ence Bureau. Private draftsmanship is not uncommon, but it is likely that
not less than 90 percent of all legislation is at least checked in the Bureau.
During the regular session, three out of four members will make some use
of the research facilities of the Legislative Council.
Except for the Budgetary Commission which dates to 1937, the estab-
lishment of permanent commissions operating under continuing legislation
and concerned with substantive matters is a relatively new development in
the Illinois legislative process. Two permanent commissions, the Motor Ve-
hicle Laws Commission and the Commission to Visit State Institutions, the
"See Illinois Legislative Council, Annual Report for 1952-1953 (Springfield:
August, 1953), p. 5.
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latter a revival of a long dormant commission on that subject, were author-
ized by the 1951 session to undertake continuing studies of the statutes per-
taining to motor vehicles, and to make continuing investigations of state
institutions, respectively. The Motor Vehicle Laws Commission presented a
legislative program to the 1953 session, while the visitation group gave a
report containing recommendations, but no bills were introduced as com-
mission legislation.
Other legislative commissions have some of the characteristics of the two
permanent commissions, but their operating statutes are not continuing law,
and the General Assembly must reenact the enabling statute at each session.
The present interim commissions with quasi-permanent status include the
Pension Laws Commission (originally established in 1945) and the School
Problems Commission (established in 1949).
Some of the established commissions, particularly those that have had a
continuing existence, have become established as clearing houses for certain
kinds of legislation. Proposals dealing with subject matter within the area
of commission concern must conform to commission policy or surely fail of
enactment. Probably the outstanding example of this type of influence is the
practice of submitting evidence of Pension Laws Commission approval
of proposals concerned with public employee pensions.
Individuals constituting an interim commission will sometimes introduce
proposals that have been planned by the entire commission, but standing
committee bills are a rarity in Illinois. Lacking professional staffing, most
standing committees are simply not organized for the preparation of legisla-
tion. On the other hand, the interim commissions are invariably staffed, and
sometimes do initiate legislation, as contrasted with standing committees
that passively consider bills referred to them. The interim Commission to
Study State Government sponsored 167 bills in the 1951 General Assembly,
but only five proposals introduced in that session were identified as standing
committee bills. Just one committee bill was offered in the entire 1953
session. In short, a bill referred to a standing committee is the opening
wedge for action. A group with a problem situation but no specific legisla-
tive proposal may succeed in interesting an interim commission, but it takes
a bill to energize a standing committee, and it takes a member formally to
introduce a bill.
Responsibility for introducing legislative proposals is invariably individ-
ual rather than collective. Although most bills bear the names of several
sponsors, a measure is properly associated with the first named member. By
way of developing broad support, a Senator or a Representative will en-
courage colleagues to join in sponsoring a proposal, but such action does not
give members who "get on" a bill in this fashion any control over its legis-
lative path. Indeed, co-sponsors have been known to impede progress of a
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bill as actively as formal opponents. There is, however, no evidence that
multiple sponsorship is any more effective than individual sponsorship, and
multiple sponsorship almost never should be taken to mean that a bill is
necessarily the product of joint thinking.
Occasionally, a member will be unwilling to assume responsibility for a
proposal but, at the same time, feels an obligation to oblige some part of his
constituency. Such a dilemma is conveniently resolved by marking a bill
"by request" thereby giving the legislator an opportunity to test the strength
of the adherents and simultaneously preserve his claim to the bill. From time
to time, such bills become law as with bills introduced "by request" in 1953
pertaining to policemen's retirement and pensions, state employees' pensions,
and the transfer of title of state lands.
Constitutional Change
I do say that it is wrong for the people of Illinois to expect that the
legislature shall submit every two years three brand new attempts to
tear up that basic law, under which, to my way of thinking, Illinois has
prospered fairly well over the years."
Constitutional change comes hard in Illinois. The power to initiate
action is vested exclusively in an extraordinary majority of the General
Assembly and the power of ratification in an extraordinary majority of the
voters at a general election.'* Although ratification requirements have been
eased somewhat since approval of a so-called "gateway" amendment in
1950, the General Assembly remains deliberately conservative in exercising
its power to initiate substantive or major constitutional change.
The
"gateway" amendment specifically limits the General Assembly to
proposing amendments to no more than three articles of the Constitution,
but it is not intended to debar simultaneous amendment of several sections
of an article. In fact, because it was developed as a compromise between the
status quo and the constitutional convention, it seems likely that the gateway
procedure was expected to facilitate total overhaul of individual articles,
but the tendency has been to limit proposals to amendment of parts of
individual articles. This suggests a narrow interpretation of the three article
"gateway" limitation to a three subject limitation for practical purposes.
Moreover, several members —- including the Speaker of the House — noted
during the session that authority to propose amendments to no more than
three articles does not compel submission of proposals to amend as many as
"Speaker Warren Wood— lecture, University of Illinois, April 23, 1953.
'* Amendments to no more than three articles of the constitution may be pro-
posed in any session by two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house. Ratifi-
cation requires referendum approval by either two-thirds of the electors voting on the
question or a majority voting in the general election. Prior to adoption of the "gate-
way" article in 1950, amendments to only one article could be proposed at a session
and ratification was by a majority voting in the general election only. See Illinois
Constitution of 1870, Article XIV, section 2.
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three articles. Actually, in both 1951 and 1953, the legislature has proposed
amendments to three articles.
The 1951 session proposed virtually total revision of the revenue article,
and the one attempt since adoption of "gateway" at actual total revision of
an article came in the 1953 session and dealt with the judicial article.
Judicial reform, a part of the program laid out by the Governor in his
inaugural address, was proposed in eight different resolutions, one of which
passed the Senate and reached the House floor. Structural reorganization
and a modified version of the "Missouri plan" of appointing judges from an
approved panel were the principal components of the proposal for which
the required vote of two-thirds of the elected membership of the House
could not be won despite persistent pressure from the Chicago and Illinois
Bar Associations, the press, and numerous civic groups. Last minute efforts
were made to work out a compromise which would have saved reorgani-
zation and dropped the appointment of judges, but no such solution was
acceptable to the groups involved. When it became apparent that no amend-
ment to the judicial article would be submitted to the voters, a relatively
unimportant resolution dealing with the Illinois and Michigan Canal was
pushed, and adopted in both houses the day before sine die adjournment.
A resolution to amend the executive article so as to provide a four rather
than a two year term for the State Treasurer was adopted early in the
session with strong support from the Governor whose last previous state
office had been that of Treasurer.
A 1953 proposal for amendment that was both complex and controver-
sial provided for a reapportionment of the state's legislative districts. To
be acceptable, a formula had to be developed that could accommodate
Cook County people who feel underrepresented, downstaters who profess
distrust of Cook, Chicago legislators from both parties who represent small,
"safe" districts. Democrats who allege that representation by area rather
than population will mean downstate Republican domination of at least one
house, and downstate Republicans who find the status quo generally ad-
vantageous. The resolution as finally passed by two-thirds vote of each
chamber did not seem to meet each of these group interests. Any appeal
lacking in the substance of the resolution, however, was apparently com-
pensated for by elaborate logrolling arrangements involving judicial reform
and Chicago charter revision. House minority members, who held deciding
votes, followed their leaders who first abstained, then were made party to
administration conferences, and finally gave their assent to the proposal,
although the minority leader served notice of his intention to campaign
against ratification.
The Governor has no formal function in proposing constitutional amend-
ments, but the amending process is inextricably intertwined with the admin-
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istration program, and the prestige of the Governor and his elected col-
leagues may be called up in support of such resolutions. Constitutionally
cut off from the amending process, without the power of approval or veto,
the Governor is nevertheless a very potent force in influencing legislative
behavior on constitutional matters.
Minority party measures are offered occasionally although some minority
leaders have held to the view that proposing constitutional amendments is
an exclusive responsibility of the majority. A minority sponsored resolution
to grant the vote to 18 year olds lost on the House floor in 1953, and a
proposal to authorize the elimination of the sales tax on food was voted
down in committee. A motion to non-concur was made for the record, and
was defeated on a straight party vote. Perhaps the most interesting aspect
of this latter proposal was the fact that it was offered as a new article to
the Constitution, thereby suggesting a liberal interpretation to the "gateway"
ban on proposing amendments to the same article more frequently than
every four years. It remains to be seen whether such an interpretation will
find favor when an extraordinary majority is anxious to resubmit a proposal
without the four year waiting period.
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SOME INFLUENCES ON LEGISLATIVE ACTION
The Governor
The Governor of Illinois, whether or not his party controls the legisla-
ture, has more opportunity to influence legislative action than any other
outside source. The veto power, surely the most important of his controls,
includes an item veto over appropriation measures, and goes virtually un-
challenged. The Governor is the only non-member of the legislature with a
continuous and direct access to the General Assembly starting with a bien-
nial message that the Constitution directs him to submit to the legislature at
the convening of each session, and continuing through the session with
regularly scheduled meetings with legislative leaders of both houses. He is
required to and does submit an executive budget containing a statement of
expected revenues and expenditures for the biennium and thereby has a
further control over the state purse to supplement his item veto power over
money bills. Finally, he is head of the political party that expects the bulk
of patronage, and he can be personal dispenser of patronage if he so chooses.
Gubernatorial Veto Power. The veto power is of critical importance
because of the finality of gubernatorial disapproval. Even an attempt to
override a veto is a rarity, and in fact only three vetoes have been over-
ridden since the adoption of the Constitution in 1870. In the 1953 session,
the Governor vetoed more bills than any of his predecessors, but in no
instance was there even an attempt to override the veto. The previous veto
"record" was established in 1951, and at that session, as in the 1949 session,
only one attempt was made to override a veto.
The General Assembly's self-chosen workload schedule accounts for the
infrequency of attempts to override vetoes in Illinois. A veto message
cannot be considered by a legislative body that has adjourned. The tendency
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of the General Assembly to complete most of its work the last weeks of
the session insures that only a relatively small number of bills can make
the round trip between the Capitol, the Governor's Mansion, and the
Capitol before June 30. Although the Governor, by constitutional provision,
has ten days after he receives a bill to act, this does not necessarily mean
ten days after passage. The Supreme Court has ruled that the ten day
period starts after the Governor receives a bill.-^ Before the bill is sent to
the Governor, it must be prepared in final form, and must be signed by the
President of the Senate and the Speaker of the House. Both processes can
be made time consuming, which makes it possible for a considerable period
to elapse before the Governor has official possession of a bill.
The Governor completed action on bills passed by the 1953 General
Assembly in twenty days after adjournment in contrast to the forty-one day
period required in 1951. Despite the relative promptness in acting on
passed bills in 1953, the great majority of the veto decisions were made
after the adjournment of the General Assembly: 81 percent (or 110) of the
136 bills vetoed in full at the last session were vetoed after adjournment,
and five of the seven bills on which the Governor exercised his item veto
power were returned after adjournment. At the 1951 session, an ev^en
higher percentage of veto messages, 87 percent (or 117) of the 134 bills
disapproved, were delivered after adjournment. Through the years, most of
the more significant vetoes have come after adjournment, although many
post-session vetoes are made necessary by technical imperfections in the
legislation. Those bills passed early enough to permit being returned during
the session are likely to be concerned with statutory technicalities rather
than substantive public policy. As to quantity, more than half the bills
reaching third reading in the second chamber in 1953 came to a final vote
during the last week of the session.
The relatively equal party division in the Illinois House of Representa-
tives, a result of the cumulative voting system, makes it virtually impossible
to obtain sufficient votes in the House to override the Governor's veto on
those rare occasions when the legislature is ,in session to receive a veto
message. The Governor's political influence need be only great enough to
persuade most members of his own party, even if they are a distinct
minority, to vote to sustain a veto, or at least to abstain from voting.
Abstainers are acting in support of the executive, because the Illinois Con-
stitution requires the affirmative votes of two-thirds of the members elected
to each house to override a veto.
Of the total bills introduced in 1953, when one party controlled legisla-
tive and executive branches, 8.2 percent were vetoed, and of the bills that
passed both houses, 14.5 percent were vetoed. The corresponding percentage
Peo. ex. rel. Peterson v. Hughes, 372 111. 602, (1940).
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figures for the 1951 session, where control was divided, were 6.6 percent
and 12.9 percent. These figures for the last two sessions represent a sharp
increase over those for other recent sessions, and reflect the fact that if the
legislature is any less discriminating in passing bills, the Governor tends to
re-establish statistical balance at least. ^"^
An unusual aspect of the Governor's veto actions in 1953 was that he
did not file any bills without his signature. Bills so treated become law in
Illinois whether filed after adjournment or during the session. The "pocket
veto" is not available to an Illinois Governor. It is the usual practice for
the Governor to file bills to which he is reluctant to give his approval, and
in 1951, for example, 24 bills became law without the Governor's signature,
while in 1949, 16 bills became law in this manner.
Gubernatorial practice in seeking and utilizing staff or other advisory
opinions on bills has varied, of course, depending on the habits and methods
of the governor involved. Most executives have, as a matter of practice
solicited opinions from the directors of code departments and other agencies
to be affected by the legislation and from the Attorney General. The
present Governor, like many of his predecessors, sought out a man not
officially connected with his administration for principal help in disposing
of the legacy left by the General Assembly.
A particularly significant indication of the extent of gubernatorial con-
trol over the legislature was seen in 1953 when the General Assembly passed
bills providing for thirty legislative interim commissions to study particular
problems and report to the 1955 session. Appropriations to these commis-
sions would have totaled four times the amount allotted to such activities
in the executive budget. Accordingly, the Governor vetoed half of the bills
involved, in most instances noting the availability of existing legislative
service agencies to undertake the project proposed.-' Plainly a nice question
in legislative-executive relationships and the propriety of the exercise of the
veto power is raised by gubernatorial denial of authority and funds to the
legislature to establish a committee of its own members to study a
legislative problem.
The Administration Program. A preferred place in the legislative
process is assigned to the formal administration program as set forth by
the Governor in the message to the General Assembly that he is required
by constitutional directive to submit at the convening of each legislative
session. A convenient box score of success can often be developed by com-
paring these messages with the "state of the State" message he is similarly
required to submit at the conclusion of his term of office. Thus, at a session
^* See Appendix C.
" In addition, the Governor vetoed the appropriation items for two commissions,
but approved the creation of the bodies.
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coincident with a change of governors, the legislature receives two mes-
sages, the outgoing Governor summarizing his record and recommending
legislation on the convening day, and the new Governor voicing his aspira-
tions a few days later at his inauguration.-*
These recommendations by the incumbent Governor in his required
biennial message become the hard core of the "administration program"
and the personal prestige of the Governor, which may rise or fall with
their enactment or their defeat, is put behind the program. It is not the
practice for the Governor to send formal requests for legislation after his
opening address, but the indirect techniques rarely leave his position in
doubt. From time to time during the session, the Governor, through a press
conference, or through his party's floor leaders, will announce the addition
of legislative proposals to his program. Matters of lesser importance may be
blessed without a public announcement, but are handled by agencies under
the Governor's jurisdiction. Legislators interested in knowing which of the
less significant proposals are introduced with gubernatorial backing will
study the calendars and the digests and note sponsorship. Administration
legislation is likely to be sponsored jointly by the majority floor leader and
the chairman of the appropriate standing committee.
Major planks in the administration program at the 1953 session in-
cluded constitutional amendments providing for legislative reapportion-
ment, judicial reform, and a lengthened term for the state treasurer. Each
of these was included in the message. Subsequently, the reapportionment
proposal was described by the Speaker of the House in a newspaper inter-
view as "the keystone in the arch of the Governor's whole legislative
program . . ." although no such special status was evident from the
message. Some other specific recommendations requiring statutory change,
and called for in the Governor's inaugural address, provided for establish-
ing a crime investigating commission, development of a toll roads system,
a change in the primary election date, absentee voting by the sick, shortened
terms of oflBce for party committeemen in Cook County, strengthened
regulator)' inspection laws, extending the general veterans' benefits to Ko-
rean war veterans, and construction of a new state office building. On the
other hand, the session was well along before the Governor announced
publicly that he favored the establishment of an operating Commission on
Equal Job Opportunities, and an eviction moratorium measure. In addi-
tion, the Governor w^ent on record in favor of measures introduced by
individual legislators, or recommended by an interim legislative commission.
In this category were bills providing for the construction of a convention
°* For example, see the messages of Adlai E. Stevenson, delivered January 7,
1953, and William G. Stratton, delivered January 12, 1953, at pages 16-22 and 30-
34, respectively, of the Journal of the House of Representatives of the Sixty-eighth
General Assembly.
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hall in Chicago, and a series of bills establishing a new Youth Commission.
The Governor seems less likely to take a public stand in opposition to a
pending bill, perhaps because of confidence in the finality of his veto power.
On occasion, however, two approaches to a problem will be proposed, and
the circumstances are such that one must be supported and one explicitly
rejected. In one 1953 situation of this kind, involving increased taxing
power for Chicago, some downstate legislators supported a minority party
bill in early votes with the understanding that their support would be
withdrawn if and when the Governor expressed himself to the contrary.
He did — and they did. The voting pattern in committee on a controversial
bill is not a dependable indicator of voting on the floor unless the Gov-
ernor has declared himself before committee action.
The Executive Budget. The preparation of the budget, under the
present Illinois pattern, is a joint legislative and executive function, but
final determination of amounts to be appropriated is solely a concern of
the legislature, subject, of course, to the item veto. Detailed work on the
budget is principally the responsibility of the Department of Finance. The
department works closely in the undertaking with the Budgetary Commis-
sion, which is considered to be a legislative agency, despite the Governor's
membership.
The Budgetary Commission, however, is an advisory group only, al-
though one of its major advantages is in giving the Governor a preview of
legislative attitudes on budget questions.'^
The executive budget, transmitted to the legislature in the form of a
budget message, accompanied by a detailed budget document, is the take-
off point for appropriations so that the first word is that of the Governor.
The budget message at the 1953 session was delivered on March 30, weeks
earlier than in all but one other session in the last twenty-two years. The
submission date, which can be controlled by the Governor despite a
statutory deadline of April 1, has considerable significance in controlling
the overall flow of work in the legislature because it is the practice to take
a rather leisurely pace until the budget has been submitted, and the bills
implementing the budget have been introduced. Consequently, the Gov-
ernor can have an important role in expanding or contracting the general
legislative time schedule through his budget power.
Senate Confimiation. The constitutional and statutory requirements
that the Senate advise and consent to certain of the Governor's appointees
to state offices do not result in any real measure of Senate control over
'^ For a detailed description of the procedures followed in preparing the budget,
and the legislative action on the budget, see Roger Henn, Control of the Purse
Strings— Part 1, "The Present Fiscal Process and Controls over State Expenditures,"
(Springfield: Taxpayers' Federation of Illinois, 1952).
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executive appointments. The most recent rejection of a gubernatorial ap-
pointee came at a special session in 1950 when a nominee for President of
the Civil Service Commission was not confirmed. The Senate Executive
Committee, to which nominations are referred, is not able to undertake
more than a perfunctory examination of nominees because of the lack of
staffing. In short, "advice and consent," in practice, has come to be closer
to a ministerial than a discretionary function of the Senate.
This observation gains credence when it is noted that at the 1953
session, the Senate referred to its Executive Committee only nominations
to salaried positions while nominees to non-salaried positions were con-
firmed upon the delivery of the nomination message from the Governor. In
the only confirmation dispute of the session, newspaper activity, which is
frequently used as a substitute for staff work in matters affecting the
General Assembly, resulted in extraordinarily sharp questioning, in the
Executive Committee, of the nominee for the position of Director of
Insurance. When confirmation came before the Senate, however, the
nominee reveived 37 aye votes, with all but one of the minority party
members voting "present."
The 18 month period between regular sessions contributes to the rela-
tive strength of the Governor and relative weakness of the Senate in matters
of confirmation. An appointee may hold office— and make policy— from
July until a year from the following January without opportunity for the
Senate to act. In 1953, with a change in administration, sundry interim
nominations made by the retiring Governor were ignored, and subsequent
nominations of the new Governor confirmed.
The General Assembly has shown no disposition to alter the present
situation. In fact, the 1951 session added to the positions requiring con-
firmation members of the Public Aid Commission, Liquor Control Com-
mission, State Athletic Commission, Medical Center Commission, and the
Racing Board. Notaries public no longer require confirmation, thereby
eliminating the need for publication of a supplementary journal each
session containing the names of 10,000 approved notaries. The Senate con-
tinues, however, to advise and consent to gubernatorial appointees to the
quasi-local county offices of public guardian and conservator, and the
lucrative office of public administrator. In these as well as other offices.
Senate confirmation is routine save for the most extraordinary situation.
The Press
Illinois newspapers that assign legislative correspondents to Springfield
during a session are primarily interested in providing coverage of legislative
activities for their readers, but in so doing they exercise potent influence on
legislative action. Editorial positions on pending legislation, preferential
news treatment, and press investigations into legislative matters, are part
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of the complex of factors that ultimately are resolved in legislative votes.
Not infrequently, newspaper investigations try to achieve the kinds of
results that are achieved by an investigating committee of the national
Congress. The papers, particularly in Chicago, take an editorial position
on most important pending legislation and no legislative leader is unaware
of press sentiment. The press representatives are a heterogeneous group as
regards experience, understanding of legislative affairs, and devotion to
objective reporting. Legislators are very much concerned, however, about
maintaining popularity with the press, although speculation by political
reporters is sometimes resented. "My career would be appreciably brighter
if that man would stop anticipating it" said one Senator after a political
columnist had promoted him to an important position of leadership prior
to the convening of the legislature.
During the first part of the 1953 session, newspapers covering the
sessions of the House received considerable attention from members, who
at various times rose on
"points of personal privilege" to deliver answers to
stories that were considered personal attacks. One theme running through
legislators' replies was that the press takes stands for and against pending
bills, and must expect to be treated as are other partisan groups. The
regular newspaper correspondents conduct a biennial poll to designate
their choices as outstanding legislators of the session, and the results are
not lightly regarded by members of the General Assembly and others.
Influence of the Press. Although the influence of the press is not scien-
tifically measurable, certain examples, chiefly relating to Chicago papers,
can be cited to show some results of newspaper activities. One Chicago
newspaper pressed with such persistence for a bill providing for a new
Chicago convention hall that the proposed edifice became known in the
legislative halls as "Tagge's Temple," out of regard for the chief Springfield
reporter for that paper. Another Chicago paper claimed credit
— with
considerable supporting evidence— for two so-called reform measures
adopted by the legislature. The first of these abolished a legislative investi-
gating commission that had had a long, controversial existence through the
years, while a second would have established tighter controls over the
printing practices of state agencies. Still another Chicago paper has sup-
ported with such vigor the so-called "dog bill" (or anti-vivisection bill) in
past sessions that the members of the legislature have regularly been
deluged with mail on the subject.
Most Illinois papers have taken strong positions on such critical issues
as reapportionment, judicial reorganization, anti-subversive bills, and truck
license fee legislation. One downstate chain of newspapers has taken a
particularly active roll in fights on trucking legislation generally and this
participation has weighed heavily on downstate members who usually are
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not subject to such close scrutiny by the local press. Over-all, the point is
that the Illinois press behaves in something of the same manner as other
groups who participate in legislative action. The Illinos State Federation of
Labor and the Taxpayers' Federation of Illinois publish scorecards of
voting records and so do some newspapers. All three groups rate members
on the basis of special interest standards, a fact that some legislators feel
is indequately understood in the case of the newspapers.
The press sometimes is used as a way of testing group reaction to al-
ternate lines of legislative policy. This has been known to have an unex-
pected twist, as in the case of a legislative committee that directed its
chairman to tell reporters of its intention to recommend that the City of
Chicago be granted permissive power on a highly controversial question.
The committee allowed adequate time to reverse itself if publication of
this report caused intense opposition. Some newspapermen, however, mis-
understood the story and reported that all cities in Illinois would be
included in the scope of the proposed legislation. There was hardly a
ripple of observable reaction either in Chicago or downstate. The com-
mittee reassembled in special session and ratified the erroneous newspaper
story rather than its own original decision.
Legislative Broadcasting. The primary source of news and information
on legislative activities is the newspapers, but a new medium was intro-
duced for the first time at the 1953 session, when the sessions were broad-
cast on a limited basis. The interest in the broadcasting venture originated
from unsuccessful attempts to broadcast certain committee proceedings at
the 1951 session, and the resulting request to the Legislative Council for a
study of the problem of legislative broadcasting and recording practices.
Sessions were broadcast weekly, direct on a Springfield FM station every
Wednesday morning, and later condensed for a half hour rebroadcast in
the evening on AM. House members were made aware of the broadcasting
of the proceedings by an "on the air" light, and there is no question but
that it affected the normal pattern of debate, especially that of members
from districts within range of the broadcasting station.
The Lobby
An observant employee of the General Assembly estimates that there is
a minimum of 100 active organized groups steadily watching, advising, and
hoping to influence the work of the legislature. They are neither registered
nor regulated so that the actual number of organizations represented in
Springfield is not known, although representatives of some fifty-seven
groups appeared at a special dinner-meeting for new members of the
General Assembly, and it is known that not all groups participated.
30
^ This dinner meeting was one of six such sessions, sponsored for several years by
a member of the House, at which indoctrination speeches are made by legislative and
executive leaders.
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Method of Operation. Lobbying sites vary according to the person-
abihty and influence of the lobbyist, with some "legislative representatives"
spending considerable time around the legislative chambers, while others
spend most of their time in Springfield hotels, or, in the case of groups
with Springfield headquarters near the capitol, in their own offices. Several
of the most influential lobbyists are very rarely around the State House.
Some statewide groups concentrate on local membership contact with leg-
islators on the assumption that a legislator is subject to fewer stresses once
he is away from Springfield.
Many observable lobbying activities around the legislative chambers
have no element of subtlety whatever. Such groups as the organized police
and firemen admittedly tried to create the impression that large numbers
of their members from all over the state were in constant attendance to
watch and report on legislative behavior in 1953. Hearing rooms and the
galleries were regularly packed by uniformed policemen and firemen so
that there was no mistaking their identity. Similarly, the truckers, anxious
for a cancellation of impending increases in license fees, came in work
clothes, and thereby emphasized numbers. This group announced, early in
the session, that it was going to stage a statewide "strike" and tie up
traffic on the highways, if its demands for lower license fees were not met
by the General Assembly. The implication was that the legislature would
be blamed for not
"doing something." There was no full scale strike, and
fee increases were readjusted although no oversimplified cause and effect
relation should be assumed.
The legislative attitude toward lobbyists as a group is a continuous
mixture of condemnation and praise. Members know that lobbyists exist,
and by and large like the lobbyists as people, but from time to time many
legislators have uneasy feelings that independence should be asserted as
both principle and fact. A Chicago member took the floor to state that
most lobbyists are honorable persons who render invaluable service to the
General Assembly by providing information on pending legislation, and
presenting their organizations' positions. Later in the session, certain lobby
groups came in for sharp criticism on the floor for their activities in trying
to get a bill adopted that would have banned educational television at state
supported universities and colleges. Irritated more by techniques used than
by the substantive demands of the lobbyists representing trucking interests,
both houses passed a bill to create an interim commission to investigate
trucking associations. The bill was vetoed by the Governor, who asked:
. . . why there should not be a similar investigation of the members of
all other industries, which had an interest in legislation. . . . No reason
has been pointed out why the trucking industry should be singled out
for investigation. . . .^^
" Veto Messages of William G. Stratton on Bills Passed by the Sixty-eighth
General Assembly, p. 54.
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In an attempt to provide some control over lobbyists, and to stake out
a claim to such legislation for the party, a minority bill was introduced in
the 1953 session to require the registration of all lobbying groups, and the
filing of certain financial reports by these groups. This bill was defeated in
the House Executive Committee after a hearing at which only the sponsor
testified, a circumstance that suggests that there was no greater expectation
of success this session than in the past.
Control over the lobby, of course, may be effectively exercised by the
very existence of organized pressure groups on both sides of an issue with
antipodal groups checking statements and tactics of each other. At most
recent sessions, for example, the chiropractors of Illinois have had legisla-
tion introduced to clarify the legal status of their profession. The medical
associations have attracted sufficient group strength to the antichiropractic
cause to defeat such legislation. In the absence of medical opposition, the
chiropractic lobby would very likely find that a comparatively small
number of friendly legislators could arrange for the votes necessary to pass
their bill.
An illustration of practical adaptation to the operations of strong
counter interests is the labor-management-legislative arrangement by which
only "agreed" amendments to the workmen's compensation, occupational
diseases, and unemployment compensation laws are adopted."- Similarly,
legislation affecting the mining industry of the state is usually "agreed" to
by the mine operators and the mining unions. This pattern has been insti-
tutionalized in the past through the Mining Investigation Commission, a
state supported agency. It had been understood by the legislature that
Commission approval w-as a condition for enactment of any mining bill
just as the approval of parallel boards was required for passage of the com-
pensation measures. A less formal technique may develop for mining legis-
lation as a 1953 gubernatorial veto ended the life of the commission which
had been re-established at all but one session since 1909.
The groups with lobbying experience nearly always are more successful
than the ad hoc groups, partly because the former are more familiar with
techniques to accomplish the same purpose in a variety of ways. In 1953,
groups representing the tax supported higher educational institutions spon-
sored a bill to exempt from state military scholarship benefits veterans re-
ceiving financial assistance for education from the federal government,
under the G. I. Bill. Legislation to accomplish this change in military
scholarship eligibility requirements passed through the Senate without
opposition. By the time it reached the House Military and Veterans Com-
mittee, an ad hoc group of student veterans had organized considerable
^^ See Gilbert Y. Steiner, Legislation by Collective Bargaining, (Urbana: Uni-
versity of Illinois Press, 1951).
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opposition, and the bill was defeated by a one-sided vote (18-1) in com-
mittee. The ad hoc group went home, but the higher education lobby had
other business and stayed around the Capitol. While student veterans were
beginning summer vacations, the military scholarship limitation was added
to the provisions of a pending Senate bill that made a minor change in the
school code. The Senate passed the bill with the "rider" attached — an
unusual technique in the Illinois legislature— thereby bringing the issue to
the floor of the House for the first time. The House, after enough debate to
make the legislative history of the measure known to all members, passed
the bill and the Governor subsequently approved it.
Intergovernmental Activity
The federal government makes few demands on the Illinois legislature
and the legislature makes only occasional requests of the federal govern-
ment, but the General Assembly is constantly besieged by spokesmen for
Illinois local governments who, in the words of Charles Merriam, "move
down upon the legislature at Springfield and engage in a grand scramble
for increases in taxation or other revenue, in borrowing power or other
financial favors."^^ One of the most striking things about this activity in
recent years is the inability of city officials and their organizations to
influence the legislature to act in accord with the municipal interest. Al-
though the highly organized Chicago political system can result in sympa-
thetic consideration of Chicago problems by Chicago Democrats in the
General Assembly, the Republican majority is less susceptible to this kind
of influence because Republican strength in the internal Chicago political
picture is very limited.
Downstate, political organization is centered at the county level rather
than in the cities. County party leaders and city officials are infrequently
identical. The city officials have not hesitated to storm Springfield, but
many legislators, in evaluating the strength of this group, consider it to be
a minor force. To support the proposals of the city spokesmen, particularly
in the revenue field, means antagonizing taxpayer groups, embarrassing the
state administration by making it indirectly responsible for tax increases,
and alienating the special subjects of taxation be they businessmen, auto-
mobile owners, retail merchants, hotel owners, or real property holders.
The city officials are unable to marshal sufficient group strength to counter-
act this opposition.
Between the 1951 and 1953 sessions, an interim commission had studied
the problem of municipal revenue, and its recommendations provided some-
what less than what the cities considered minimum additional revenue to
solve their predicament. On the floor, the commission's recommendations
" The Government of the Metropolitan Region of Chicago, (Chicago: Univer-
sity of Chicago Press, 1933), p. 115.
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were further cut back over the protests of municipal officials whose ex-
pressed needs were far in excess of their political strength. Although the
municipalities were given only limited additional revenue sources, their
financial position was further complicated by minimum wage legislation
forced through by the organized firemen and policemen.
Recognition of this strategic disadvantage in dealing with the legisla-
ture is implicit in the recent development by the Illinois Municipal League
of a regional system of organization for legislative matters. The only per-
missible classification of cities for special legislation is by population so that
regional organization for legislative purposes suggests a concentration on
developing local political influence that will be strategically placed and
ultimately reflected in Springfield. The present strength of the municipal
lobby will be important to the extent that its cause appeals to other groups.
In 1953, for example, technical and procedural changes in the city man-
ager law were adopted with official municipal support, but the moving
force was the State Chamber of Commerce through its lobbyist who has
become a city manager expert.
Illinois city officials are not able to present a united front to the General
Assembly because of the special position of Chicago in the total political
picture. Although Chicago holds membership in the Municipal League, the
problems of a major metropolitan center are unlike those of other munici-
palities in the state, and Chicago lobbies for itself, chiefly through the office
of its Corporation Counsel. Legislators representing Chicago districts could,
if they had incentive to vote as a unit, exert a great influence over General
Assembly action. Actually, only a relatively small number of Chicago mem-
bers of the House ever cross party and other lines in order to form a bloc.
This group, either by design or by chance, established numerical strength
on the House Municipalities Committee in the 1953 session. Other members
of that committee felt that one consequence of this situation was that the
Speaker tended to refer "doubtful" bills to the Revenue Committee rather
than the Municipalities Committee.
In general, Chicago members are no more likely to be controlled by a
Chicago allegiance than by a party or other kind of allegiance. A striking
illustration of this kind of situation was seen in a proposal offered in 1951
and in 1953 to permit Chicago, in selling water, to establish a differential
between rates charged suburban governments and rates charged Chicago
consumers. Although the suburban governments admittedly resold the Chi-
cago water to their own residents at substantial profits, a solidarity that
was evident among Chicago Senators in 1951 evaporated after the issue
was made a party question in 1953. Indeed, the Chicagoan who spon-
sored the legislation in 1951 abstained from voting on a similar bill two
years later.
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Local governments in Illinois other than the cities enjoy relatively
pacific relationships with a General Assembly most of whose members are
rural rather than urban oriented. Because the financial plight of the town-
ships and counties is not as troublesome as that of the cities, that area of
potential conflict simply has not developed. Two important questions
exclusively involving county or township government arose at the 1953
session. County officials guided legislation giving them a raise in pay pur-
suant to a constitutional amendment adopted at the 1952 general election
authorizing the General Assembly to set these salary scales. Township
spokesmen lobbied for increased freedom in the spending of their share of
gas tax revenues, but time ran out before adherents could untangle a snarl
caused by the indecisiveness of a Senator who represented the twenty-sixth
affirmative vote.
Special districts rarely push their own legislation. In the case of school
districts, an interim School Problems Commission has virtually the, last
word on legislation. Its report will reflect consideration of the viewpoints
of groups with professional, financial and social interests in schools — the
Taxpayers' Federation, Education Association, Congress of Parents and
Teachers, Association of School Boards, Chamber of Commerce, and Agri-
cultural Association. Except for the Sanitary District of Chicago, the bulk of
the other local units— from airport authorities to surface water protection
districts— are infrequent subjects of General Assembly concern.
The legislature is the lawmaker, but it would be a mistake to assume
that public policy can be understood by an examination of the output of
the General Assembly. The Illinois Constitution, consistent with those of
the other forty-seven states and that of the national government, provides
for a separation of powers. Legislative, administrative and judicial office
are incompatible, but public policy making is not restricted to the legisla-
ture. The administrative rules guiding enforcement of the sales tax, for
example, are critical to understanding state tax policy-— and so are the
broadening and narrowing decisions of the courts.
The Illinois General Assembly must be understood in its setting as a
coordinate branch of state government with the executive and judicial de-
partments. Pressures play upon all three branches, and no policy question is
ever resolved for more than the briefest period of time because modification
of policy by interpretation or litigation is constant. Legislative losers may
be judicial or administrative winners.
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APPENDIX A
PARTY STRENGTH* IN SESSIONS OF THE ILLINOIS
LEGISLATURE FOR THE PERIOD 1939-1953
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APPENDIX C
FINAL STATUS OF BILLS INTRODUCED IN THE
1953 GENERAL ASSEMBLY
NUMBER OF BILLS INTRODUCED
ACTION IN CHAMBER OF ORIGIN:
Died in Standing Committee''
Died on 1st Reading*"
Died on 2nd Reading
Died on 3rd Reading
Subtotal—Died in Chamber of Origin
Passed Chamber of Origin
ACTION IN SECOND CHAMBER:
Died on 1st Reading
Died in Standing Committee''
Died on 2nd Reading*"
Died on 3rd Reading
Died pending 2nd Chamber concurrence
Subtotal—Died in Second Chamber
Passed Both Houses
EXECUTIVE ACTION
Approved*^
Vetoed
Total Acted Upon
Total
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